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Abstract
Food crisis was a very serious issue during the Civil War 
in Soviet Russia, which was mainly due to the revolt or 
resistance of the kulak in the countryside of Soviet Russia. 
To some extent, “Kulak” allowed the hunger situation 
in some regions of the Soviet Russia to go unchecked, 
which was believed to be a very severe threat for the new 
Soviet regime. Therefore, to eradicate the menace, the 
Bolsheviks led by Lenin adopted the policy of the resolute 
repression and deprivation of the kulak. As a matter of 
fact, in a word, according to the logic of the Bolsheviks, 
kulak was the culprit that engendered the famine, so kulak 
must be responsible for it, and kulak must pay the bill.
Key words: Kulak; Food crisis; The civil war; Soviet 
Russia
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INTRODUCTION
After the October Revolution of Russia in 1917, food 
crisis tended to be serious in Soviet Russia. It evolved 
into a great famine in the spring of 1918, which had been 
a recurrent issue. For resolving the food crisis, winning 
the internal and external war, and then consolidating the 
nascent Soviet regime, the Bolshevik led by Lenin had 
declared “food supply dictatorship”. However, the kulak 
turned blind eye to food shortages of urban or the front-
line troop boycotted it. Thus, Lenin thought “kulak” must 
be “responsible” for the situation that urban workers and 
the frontline army soldiers had caught in starvation, and 
also must pay the price for their “sins”. 
1.   CONCEPTIONS: “KULAK” AND 
“PROSPERING PEASANT”
Foremost, what was the Soviet kulak and prospering 
peasant, and also the distinction of the two conceptions, 
this is the basis of this research.
Who was the Soviet kulak? For this question, some 
Scholars of domestic and international Academia have 
made a full and accurate investigation. In my opinion, 
“kulak” is the one who was declared to be kulak by 
the authorities, which is a very vague term that anyone 
perhaps could be included. 
In nature, it could be roughly divided into two 
distinct stages from June 1918 to the early 1930s: Firstly, 
from June 1918 to March 1921, Lenin believed those 
who food (including newly harvested grain) doubled 
or more doubled than their own consumption (family 
rations, livestock feed, and seeds) could be regarded as 
prospering peasants. (The Compilation and Translation 
Bureau of Marx, Para. 7, 1987, Vol.35, p. 28) Those who 
did not hand over their surplus grain must be repressed 
and deprived in the name of “enemies of the people”; 
Secondly, From the Middle and Late 1920s to the early 
1930s, despite the Bolshevik introduced some relevant 
documents (i.e., the criteria for classification about 
kulak) for assessing the “kulak”, but the content was so 
ambiguous that this concept was rather like the definition 
of “saboteur”, which could include every person: 
Poor and middle peasants, peasants with large families (and 
therefore greater land or other resources), the families of Red 
army soldiers and industrial workers, members of the rural 
intelligentsia (i.e., teachers, agronomists, doctors), byvshie liudi 
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(literally former people—notables from the old regime), and 
anyone who dared to object.” (Lynne Viola, 2007, p.36)
Who was the Soviet prospering peasant? After the 
October Revolution of Russia in 1917, the “kulak” (i.e., 
prospering peasant) was those who had developed into 
the “wealthy peasant” within the principles of the “New 
Economic Policy”, let alone previously the individual had 
been the inferior kulak, middle peasants or poor peasants. 
A scholar pointed out that the source of the stratum of 
prospering peasants consisted of three parts in the Era of 
“New Economic Policy”: 
(a). Inferior kulak in pre-revolution or those who be called “tiny 
kulak”. As are relatively adept in managements, they can rapidly 
rebuild their own economy and get developing in the extent 
permitted by law; (b) The estate of middle peasants; (c)Poor 
peasants.” (Liu & Jin, 1990, p.179)
As to the distinction between the kulak and prospering 
peasant, the Academic of domestic and foreign agreed that 
the “kulak” was not the same as “prospering peasants”, 
even though generally speaking of the kulak which has 
already included the prospering peasant. In fact, the 
kulaks and wealthy peasants had constantly been confused 
as a concept, and put as a political conception in any 
event. Generally speaking, the term “kulak” is more 
attribute of politics, but “prospering peasant” is more of 
an economic characteristic. Consequently, both of which 
should be treated diversely, although the former more or 
less contains a certain degree of economic component 
(The term kulak dates to at least the middle of nineteenth 
century, when peasants and educated Russian used it to 
describe the most prospering peasants in the village). 
(Cathy A. Frierson, Semen Samuilovich Vilenskiĭ, 2010, 
p.34)
2.  “KULAK” WAS FORCED TO TAKE 
THE BLAME FOR FAMINE
“Bread”—Food as one of three slogans (the other two 
are “Peace” and “Land”) of the October Revolution of 
Russia in 1917, which illustrated the Bolshevik put an 
emphasis on grain issue. Food collection mainly served 
the front-line military and satisfied the need of urban 
residents. Actually the tsarist and the interim government 
had taken such as fixed-price, deprivation, brute-strength, 
food monopoly, and other means for endeavoring to 
resolve food crisis, but its’ effectiveness was insignificant. 
Therefore, the Bolsheviks took over this heavy legacy 
from the former administration.
For the watchword “Peace” and “Land”, “Decree 
on Peace” and “Land Statute” was promulgated by 
the Soviet government, but no ordinance for the motto 
“Bread”. If any, “surplus collection system” (i.e., “food 
supply dictatorship”) may be an edict. In fact, the Russian 
word “продразверстка” is not be translated as “surplus 
collection system”, an accurate translation should be “food 
appropriation system” , because the first half of this word 
(i.e., прод) is the abbreviation of “food”, and the later 
part of it (i.e., разверстка) is equivalent to “distribution 
or apportionment”. (Xu, 2011, p.47) Then, what was 
the “food appropriation system”? It was an economic 
policy that the entire surplus grain belonged to the 
Soviet government who stipulated the price of grain and 
prohibited all private sale of grain.
Why the grain crisis occurred? As for Lenin’s view, it 
was mainly due to the revolt or resistance of “food supply 
dictatorship” from the kulak in the village, although 
Soviet Russia “just inherited a collapse and severe 
economic destruction.” (The Compilation and Translation 
Bureau of Marx, para.7, 1987, Vol.34. p.342)
As Lenin pointed out, food crisis of urban was 
increasingly severe, which was due to “the condition that 
kulak attacked on the urban region, Soviet regime, poor 
peasants got rampant, and more frenzied.” (Ibid.) 
Moreover, “kulak” resisted the Soviet regime by “not 
turning over food to the Soviet government, in addition 
to the use of weapons.” (Ibid.) Wherein, so-called “not 
turning over food” and “weapons” mean that: Firstly, the 
kulaks and prospering peasants protested “food supply 
dictatorship” who were unwilling to sell grain to the 
Soviet government at a fixed low price; They acceded to 
the revolt by force which the oppositions organized in 
many domestic grain producing regions.
Kulaks and wealthy peasants (For the convenience 
of discussion, both hereinafter referred to as “kulak”.) 
possessed surplus grain, but were reluctant to sell grain 
to the Soviet government at a regular price, and also 
engaged in the speculative trade of food, which to some 
extent allowed the hunger situation of the urban workers, 
poor peasants, agricultural workers, frontline troops to go 
unchecked. In Lenin’s opinion, the reason of famine was 
not due to inadequate grain in Soviet Russia, but because 
the bourgeoisie and all the wealthy (including rich man, 
kulak in rural areas) made a final struggle with the Soviet 
regime on the most important and most acute problem 
(i.e., commissariat). Breaching the monopoly of grain, 
the distribution methods of provision, the fixed price, and 
executing the speculation. 
Lenin considered that although the Soviet government 
actualized “food supply dictatorship” which had been 
expressly stipulated by the law in Soviet Russia, effectively 
it was suffered the destruction of the bourgeoisie and all 
the rich:
the rich man, kulak, tyrant had oppressed the people of village for 
several decades in the countryside, and now preferred to rely on 
speculation, illegally brewing wine to profit, the justification was 
that it could make them get rich. As for bringing about the sin of 
famine, they pushed it to the Soviet regime. (Ibid., Vol.34, p.336) 
“Kulak” who partook in the speculative trade of 
grain could “earn one hundred, two hundred, or even 
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more rubles per pood.” (Ibid., Vol.34, p.334) The Soviet 
government set a fixed price of 6 rubles per pood on 
grain in the first half of 1918, but its’ price as high as 100 
rubles, and sometimes up to 200 rubles or even more on 
the black market. (Ibid., Vol.34, p.418)
Meanwhile, “kulak” joined the revolt by force which 
the counter force (such as the White Army) organized in 
many domestic grain producing areas (i.e., Volga River 
basin, Siberian region etc.). Lenin deemed that the kulak 
was an internal enemy of Soviet Russia, and also became 
a reliable object that the “robber” of capitalism of Britain 
and Japan which assumed the offensive to Russia where 
was at peace allied with: “Kulak who joined with foreign 
capitalists were opposed to domestic workers cruelly 
injured or killed the working class by the bloody and 
unheard means in all places.” (Ibid., Vol.35, p.35)
As Lenin said, the famine relentlessly threatened 
all poor peasants and urban workers in many industrial 
provinces, which were caused by the “kulak” who took 
two means (i.e., “not turning over food”, “weapons”). By 
the end of April 1918, “the ration reduced to 50 grams per 
day in Petrograd. Furthermore, only 100 grams of food 
a day in Moscow, where transportation of grains almost 
stalled and Surplus was very little.” (Kim, 1960, p.152)
Did “kulak” sit on the sidelines the food shortages of 
urban? As an independent scholar Lar T. Lih from Canada 
said: “the image created by the food supply crisis of a 
ghoul who laughed at groans of the starving and wanted to 
choke the revolution with the bony hand of hunger.” (Lih, 
1990, p.148) For this, Shire Bertrand explained: 
Mir (i.e., Russian traditional communal) which supported ‘petty 
bourgeois individualism’ regarded the family as production 
units. And this individualism combined with local selfish 
doctrine that Mir’s activities led to, which was sufficient to 
show the reason why ‘kulak’ could keep quite coldly that the 
city lacked of food and fell into an extreme difficulty. (Bertrand, 
1975, p.297) 
In this regard, I could not quite agree. However 
I believe that at least we could give a reasonable 
explanation in economic terms: compared to the price of 
the black market (i.e., 100 rubles per pood, sometimes 
even 200 rubles per pood), the rigid price (i.e., 6 rubles 
per pood) (The Compilation and Translation Bureau of 
Marx, para.7, Vol.34, p.420) was much too low, although 
the Bolsheviks increased the food price to 30 rubles 
per pood on the basis of the original (To encourage 
“kulak” to deliver grain to the Soviet government, Lenin 
recommended whether the raising price may be temporary 
or not). (Ibid., Vol.35, p.27) 
In fact, as analyzing the reasons for grain purchase 
crisis in 1927–1928, Bukharin had pointed out: “I totally 
agreed that the price should be paramount.” (E.H.Carr, 
R.W.Davies, 1969, p.79) Yet noted out, Lenin considered 
a behavior that the interim Prime Minister Alexander 
Kerensky increased the price of food to double as the 
connivance of “kulak”. (Ibid., Vol.34, p.381)
In summary, Lenin believed it was an inextricable 
relation between famine and “kulak”. Namely, “kulak” 
was the culprit who caused famine, and must be 
responsible for it.
3.  “KULAK” WAS OBLIGED TO PAY FOR 
SO-CALLED SINS
How to deal with this food crisis? Lenin advocated 
that the Bolsheviks could take grains from peasants in 
the rural districts, “demanding peasants supply food” 
(Ibid., Vol.33, p.65), since the Soviet Russian had much 
“enough” cereals. Just as Lenin envisaged: “As long as 
we inventoried grain, identified all existing storages, and 
punished the illegal activities, famine will not appear in 
Soviet Russian.” (Ibid., Vol.34, p.250) Thence, if kulak 
did not hand surplus grain to the Soviet government at a 
fixed price, they would be severely castigated. Wherefore 
Lenin called the kulak to surrender surplus grain, avoid 
speculating, and not to exploit the labor of others. 
Otherwise, we would relentlessly combat with you. 
In other words, putting an end to the food crisis means 
that the Soviet government made a desperate fight with 
the kulak: “Kulaks knew that it was time to put a final 
and brutal battle for Socialism.” (Ibid., Vol.34, p.420) 
“No any margin where we could have a doubt. Kulak 
was the sworn enemy of the Soviet regime. Not kulak 
killed countless workers, or workers ruthlessly put down 
the insurrection that the predator of kulak who was the 
minority of the population objected to the regime of 
laboring people. There was no a middle path. The working 
class and kulak could never live in harmony with each 
other, because it was not difficult for the kulak to make 
his peace with landlords, tsarist and priests, even if they 
had occurred quarrel, but would never be possible for the 
working class.” (Ibid., Vol.35, p.36)
The food problem had risen to political height, which 
is to say the matter of “kulak” was became a political 
issue. Lenin instructed the local Soviet government to 
combine the repression of “kulak” with the confiscation 
of their properties or grains at least twice in August 
1918. Such as Lenin sent a telegram to Penza Province 
Presidium President Alkyne MinKim on August 12th 1918, 
suggested that he took advantage of the opportunity of 
the repression of kulak’s revolt to confiscate their cereals, 
which could consolidate the poor peasant’s regime in the 
frontline region. On August 19th 1918, Lenin telegraphed 
to the Executive Committee of Zee Dorothy Wits of Orel 
province, directed that they put the repression revolts of 
kulaks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries with the 
confiscation all the food of kulak together. 
Moreover, On August 20th 1918, Lenin wired to the 
Executive of Levny County of Orel province, praised that 
the county repressed kulaks forcefully, and confiscated all 
those who were involved in rebellion grains or properties. 
(Ibid., Vol.35. pp.606-608) The strife was not just an 
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economic discord on the front of food, which could be 
portrait as a political dispute about the Soviet regime’s 
existence. To some extent, the outcome of struggling with 
kulak was the fate of the new Soviet regime. Just as Lenin 
pointed out: “It looked like this was just a battle for food, 
actually it was the clash for Socialism.” (Ibid., Vol.34, 
p.420)
However, Lenin believed that food was plundered by “a 
variant of the capitalist” (Ibid., Vol.29, p.165) —Private 
Farmer (i.e., kulak), the government depended on a strong, 
armed force to purchase the grain which was looted by the 
kulaks at a fixed low price. 
Moreover, such an approach was undoubtedly correct. 
on August 11th 1918, Lenin sent telegram to Kulayev, 
indicated that: “It must be the most resolute, the most 
rapid and most ruthless for the repression of the uprising 
kulaks, from Penza transferred part of the armies, the 
confiscation of all the riots’ properties and food,” “drawing 
up a draft decree—Each village of grain production 
should take 25–30 richer as hostages, they must use their 
lives to ensure that all surplus grain would be collected,” 
The interests of the revolution required to do so, it should come 
up with a model……seeking for some tough: (a) Hanging 
(being sure to hang, so people could see) no less than 100 
flagrant richer, kulaks, vampires; (b) Publishing their names; 
(c) Confiscating all their grains; 4.Specifying the hostage. Let 
people see it in the radius of a few hundred, all trembled, knew, 
and shouted: “The vampire of kulak was hanged by them,” all to 
be hanged. (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 2000, 
p.4)
During the grim period in the civil war, Lenin’s 
telegram to the provinces and letters was full of these 
tones: “Hang,” “Toughness,” and “Merciless terrors.” (Jin 
Yan, 2012, p.1) But the force of peasant was applied by 
the Bolshevik, which is tantamount to wage a war against 
them, was a naked violent plunder. Although the Soviet 
government utilized a brute-force for the “kulaks”, but 
the Soviet government obtained no small successes. For 
instance, the first half of 1918 the Soviet government 
only acquired 28 million poods of grains, but the second 
half procured 67 million poods, so the number was still 
considerable. (Tang, 1986, p.66) Understandably, food 
crisis could be solved to some extent for providing a lot of 
help with the consolidation of the new Soviet regime.
Of course, the “kulaks” had defied “food supply 
dictatorship”, which even to some extent was considered 
to be a very arrogant deed. The most famous was started 
as early 1918. Generally peasants’ revolt of Tambov 
province was deemed to begin in 1920, which was not 
accurate. In fact, in addition to it could be confirmed by 
the archives, the historian Sennikov also pointed out that 
the uprising of the peasants of Tambov province actually 
began in early 1918. (Xu, 2011, p.47) 
Peasant’s revolt in Tambov province, ultimately it was 
quelled by the Soviet government which resorted to the 
army. Also as, (a) Stashing food: kulak utilized a variety 
of methods to conceal food—some of the food was hidden 
in wall, the floor, some made wine by food, and some 
also put a large of number of food into the ground, then 
soil was covered on the above where they could plant 
potatoes; (b) Killing the member of requisition: When 
confiscated surplus grain of “kulak”, the members of 
forager often were brutally murdered or thrown into the 
river by them, then drowned. At the time, a 25 person 
teams of levy-escort frequently left only 4 to 10 people 
finally. (The group of theory of Dalian Red-flag shipyard 
machine repair shop workers, The group of Political 
Economic of Liaoning Normal University Department of 
History, 1975, p.26) 
However, compared with the Soviet government’s 
coercive power, it was only “trivial” or “an ant trying to 
shake a big tree” (i.e., counter the coercive power of the 
Soviet government was far beyond the strength of kulak).
Generally speaking, to achieve the promise—“there 
will be bread” (a classic lines in the famous film “Lenin in 
October”), Put the brute violence on peasants, especially 
the ingredients of capitalism—kulak who was considered 
to be the primary responsibility for famine. In other 
words, kulak must pay for the price for these “sins”, this 
was the logic of the Bolsheviks.
CONCLUSION
In summary, generally we could conclude like this: In 
Lenin’s view, “kulak” should be accountable for famine, 
and also must pay the price for these “sins”. “Kulak” was 
unwilling to sell the grain at a fixed-price to the State, 
but which was considered as a revolt or resistance against 
“food supply dictatorship”, so as to lead urban workers, 
poor peasants, and army’s supply of grain to a much 
critical situation. Meanwhile, kulak joined the revolt by 
force which the counter force organized in many domestic 
grain producing regions. Therefore, the Bolshevik thought 
“kulak” was a very serious threat. Just as Lenin believed: 
“Kulak was the sworn enemy of the Soviet regime……
It could be no middle path there…… (Kulak and the 
working class) could never be harmony with each other.” 
Thus, “kulak” was coerced to take the blame for an 
irrational policy of Bolshevik, and also was compelled to 
pay the price for the consequence of it.
However, the violence to peasants which not only 
caused their casualties, but also was an almost devastating 
blow to the productivity in rural regions, and which to a 
certain extent led to the “Great Famine” of 1921–1922. 
For winning the war, the food supply gave priority to 
military. The team of food collection of armed workers 
not only confiscated “kulak” surplus grain, usually also 
imposed family rations, sometimes the seeds of the next 
year. So it was a heavy stroke for peasant’s enthusiasm 
of production, which was an important motive for the 
outbreak of famine. What’s more, the Bolsheviks preached 
and ignited the class of struggle between kulak and other 
peasant peers, which overturned the “warmth” that “though 
the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, 
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a kulak often enjoyed the respect of his peasant peers.” 
(Frierson, 1993, pp.139–160)
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